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Taxation of Cooperatives:
A Problem Solved?
Courts have long struggled with problems concerning the
nature of cooperatives. Confusion has resulted because
a cooperatives possesses attributes not only of a corpora-
tion and a joint stock association, but also of a partnership,
of a joint venture, of a charitable organization, and even
of a social club. It is not surprising, therefore, that cooper-
atives have received special treatment in the tax code.
Congress has recently enacted new provisions governing
the taxation of cooperatives, and the purpose of this
Article is to analyze the new legislation and to predict
the consequences of it. After a brief historical introduc-
tion, the authors summarize each of the new sections,
analyze the problems cooperatives will have in complying
with them, and discuss their constitutionality. They con-
clude that the new provisions are constitutional, and that
although there will be some confusion in administering
the new law, the amount of actual litigation will be slight.
Irving Clark*
Eugene M. Warlich**
The taxation of cooperatives and their patrons is not the first tax
field in which the Congress has been thwarted by the courts. But
as in others,' it has struck back. The purpose of this Article is
* Member of the Minnesota Bar.
** Member of the Minnesota Bar.
1. An example is the historic controversy between the United States Su-
preme Court and the Congress over the meaning of the estate tax provi-
sions including in the gross estate property of which the decedent made a
transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his
death. In May v. Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), the Court held that the
statute did not embrace a transfer in trust in which the transferor retain-
ed a life estate. There was substantial outcry, and the Court was given a
chance to reconsider in three new cases, in two of which the circuit courts
of appeals had come to an opposite conclusion. On March 21, 1931, four
days after hearing argument, the Court announced its decision per curiam
on the authority of May v. Heiner. Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283
U.S. 782 (1931); Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783 (1931); McCormick v.
Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931). The next day both houses of Congress passed
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to examine the new legislation designed to cure the Congress' frus-
tration in the field of taxation of cooperatives and to predict the
tax consequences to the thousands of cooperatives throughout the
nation.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Numerous reviews are available of the body of rulings and case
law that created the situation faced by the Congress in 1951.'
They indicate that the Treasury and the courts had mapped out
two basic principles. First, a cooperative (or any other corpora-
tion) that distributed its net "savings" to its patrons in proportion
to their patronage and pursuant to an obligation to do so existing
at the time the patronage occurred was "exempt" and, thus, enti-
tled to exclude those net savings from its gross income and, there-
by, from its net income.3 The reasoning was that the cooperative
had not realized income because the amounts involved belonged
to the partons from the beginning.' Second, the patron had real-
ized the income that the cooperative had harvested for him, and
he was taxable upon it.5
These principles were not without their attackers, both in and
out of Congress.6 They contended that while the rationale sounded
the famous Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, amending the statute to
include specifically transfers in which the transferor had retained a life
estate. See I PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 7.14 (1942).
2. E.g., Nieman, Multiple Contractual Aspects of Cooperatives' By-Lv.v.
39 MINN. L. REV. 135 (1955); Paul, The Justifiability of the Policy of
Exempting Farmers' Marketing and Purchasing Cooperative Organizations
from Federal Income Taxes, 29 MINN. L. REV. 343 (1945); Rumble, Co-
operatives and Income Taxes, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 534 (1948); Sow-
ards, Should Co-ops Pay Federal Income Taxes?, 19 TENN. L. REV. 908
(1947). See generally PACKEL, COOPERATIVES (3d ed. 1956) and the authori-
ties cited therein.
3. G.C.M. 17895, 1937-1 CUM. BULL. 56; I.T. 3208, 1938-2 CuM.
BULL. 127.
4. Various theories or analogies were advanced. The cooperative was
sometimes characterized as an agent or trustee, e.g., San Joaquin Valley
Poultry Producers' Ass'n v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir.
1943); a conduit, United Coops., 4 T.C. 93, 105 (1944); or a large partner-
ship of which all patrons were members, Hearings Before the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means on Proposed Revisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 1887 (1948). The result of these
theories was that the patron realized the income rather than the coopera-
tive. Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 75 (7th
Cir. 1937); Midland Co-op. Wholesale v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 824
(1941).
5. San Joaquin Valley Poultry Producers' Ass'n v. Commissioner, 136
F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1943); Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 88 F.2d 75, 76 (7th Cir. 1937) (dictum); P. Phillips, 17 T.C.
1027 (1951).
6. See generally Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and
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plausible, the facts stated were fictitious, for the earnings be-
longed to the cooperatives for all practical purposes.' They urged
that cooperatives were being given an unfair advantage by the
decisions, enabling them to finance expansion more easily than
their competitors.' The issue was clouded by related "favoritisms"
such as deductibility of dividends paid by exempt cooperatives
on their capital stock.9
Congress dealt with the controversy in 1951, adopting what
became sections 521 and 522 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.10 Unfortunately, the new law assumed, and all concerned
Means on Proposed Revisions of the Internal Revenue Code, 80th Cong.,
Ist Sess., pt. 4 passim (1948); Magill & Merrill, The Taxable Income of
Cooperatives, 49 MICH. L. REV. 167 (1950).
7.
The so-called net margins of cooperative corporations constitute in
reality the net income of such corporations; and the members of the
corporation have, for tax purposes, the same status as the stockhold-
ers of a business corporation. The net margin is quite as much the net
profit of the cooperative as the exactly similar net margin or operating
income of the stock corporation buying or selling goods next door.
Magill & Merrill, supra note 6, at 182.
Patronage refunds of a cooperative, however, are not on this in-
dividualized basis. Instead they represent the net result of the pooling
of both profits and losses on many individual transactions, and are
profits made possible only by the pooled business operations.
A cooperative may have lost money on individual business done
with John Jones but, nevertheless, John Jones participates as a busi-
ness owner in the overall profits earned in the business operations of
the cooperative. The business as a whole, through its facilities for
pooling many individual transactions in a way that resulted in earn-
ings, was responsible for earning the profit.
National Tax Equality Ass'n, Legal Tax Avoidance Threatens Private
Enterprise 18 (1945).
The position of the National Tax Equality Association is basically the
same today as shown by the following statement of its president in
May, 1961: "The excess of [a cooperative corporation's] receipts over its
costs constitutes its income just like that of any ordinary corporation."
Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means on the Presi-
dent's 1961 Tax Recommendations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 3103-04
(1961).
8. The National Tax Equality Association made the following charge:
N.T.E.A.'s Research Department has projected the hypothetical ease
of two companies, each capitalized at one million dollars, each doing
business at a profit, one as a tax-paying corporation and the other as a
tax-exempt cooperative. Figures show that the cooperative is able to
grow at a rate just ten times faster than that possible to the tax-paying
corporation.
National Tax Equality Ass'n, op. cit. supra note 7, at 9.
9. See generally the exclusions contained in Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 1, § 101(12), 53 Stat. 33.
10. See S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1951). Unfortunately,
the new legislation was put into the Code entirely in the framework of
the provisions dealing with the exempt cooperatives. Section 521 con-
tained a slight elaboration of the old rules for exemption as they had ex-
19631
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thought at the time, that what the cooperative distributed to the
patron and then excluded from the cooperative's income was ipso
facto taxable income to the patron.11 This proved not to be so.
Patrons began to contest the taxability of the "income" to them,
and the courts began to agree with them; the deluge came whcn
the Treasury finally agreed to follow the court decisions. 3 The
isted in § 101(12) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. Section 522
codified as to exempt cooperatives the existing rules permitting the de-
duction of dividends paid and amounts allocated to patrons from income
not derived from patronage. It went on to provide that "patronage divi-
dends . . . shall be taken into account in computing taxable income in
the same manner as in the case of a cooperative organization not exempt
. " To the initiated, this meant that the exempt cooperative could ex-
clude patronage refunds in the same way that the non-exempt one could,
but one had to be conversant with the existing practice of the Internal
Revenue Service and its rulings to understand that. See Farmers Co-op.
v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 315, 319, 321-324 (8th Cir. 1961).
11. See Rev. Rul. 54-10, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 24; see Farmers Co-op. v.
Commissioner, 288 F.2d 315, 323 (8th Cir. 1961).
12. Long Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 726 (4th
Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Carpenter, 219 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1955);
Moe v. Earle, 226 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1955); Caswell's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 211 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1954). In the Long Poultry Farms case,
after noting that a credit granted to a taxpayer was not salable and had no
market value nor value as collateral for a loan, the court stated: "On these
facts, as to which there is no dispute, we think it clear that taxpayer did
not receive income as the result of the credit allotted, nor did it become
entitled to receive anything which could be properly accrued as income."
249 F.2d at 728. In Carpenter, the Commissioner insisted that certificates
that had no market value should be taxed at face value to the patron
at the time of issuance upon the theory that the cooperative was under
obligation to distribute patronage dividends either in cash or in certificates,
and that respondent assented to the arrangement by becoming a patron
and therefore should be treated as if he had actually received cash in the
amount evidenced by the certificate and reinvested the cash in the coopera-
tive at the time of the issuance. The court stated:
It is abundantly clear that the taxpayer's receipt of revolving fund
certificates was not the equivalent of the actual receipt of cash, be-
cause the certificates had no fair market value. Furthermore, it is
obvious that the funds withheld by the cooperative were not subject
to the demand of the respondent. The respondent could control nei-
ther the amount of the funds that he would ultimately receive nor the
time at which he might receive them . . . . Therefore, the respondent
never actually or constructively received or had any right to receive
anything but the certificates.
219 F.2d at 636.
13. T.D. 6428. 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 26: T.D. 6429, id. at 452. To im-
plement this, the Treasury in its annual Farmers Tax Guide began advising
the farmer that if he received patronage dividends
in document form, such as certificates of indebtedness, revolving fund
certificates or stock certificates, which have no fair market value over
which you have no control as to the amount or time of their redemp-
tion in cash or other Property, they are not included in your income
until they become subject to payment on your demand-regardless of
your accounting period.
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result was that someone was receiving income, but no one was
paying tax on it. For four sessions of Congress, not only the critics
of cooperatives but also some of the cooperatives themselves ad-
vocated a tax. They differed, however, on who should be taxed;
the critics urged that cooperatives be taxed just like ordinary busi-
ness corporations without regard to patronage refunds, while the
cooperatives urged that they be permitted to exclude their patron-
age distribution as before, but that the patrons be taxed on them
as had been intended in 1951. In the Revenue Act of 1962,
Congress adopted the cooperatives' point of view with some elab-
orate congressional frills.'4
II. THE NEW PROVISIONS
The basic objective of Congress could have been achieved by a
simple enactment that net income of a cooperative distributed to
its patrons in any of various forms constituted taxable income
to the patrons. But pressures on Congress and the ideas of the
members of the congressional committees were many and varied,
resulting in a different approach.
There were two guiding principles. One was tlat distributions
by cooperatives could be either "qualified" or "non-qualified." If
they were qualified, they were taxable income to the patron and
deductible from the gross income of the cooperative; if they were
non-qualified, the patron received no income and the cooperative
had no deduction. For a patronage dividend to be qualified, a
portion of the entire distribution had to be paid to the patron in
cash. In the mind of the Senate Finance Committee, the cash por-
tion would give the patron funds with which to pay his income tax
on the entire distribution.' 5 The concept evolved because of an
earlier proposal to require withholding on all corporate dividends,
whether they were dividends paid by conventional corporations to
their stockholders or patronage dividends distributed by coopera-
tives to their patrons. 6 When the withholding proposal was aban-
doned in the face of strong opposition,'" the requirement of infor-
The average farmer promptly took the position that patronage refunds he
receives had no market value and did not report any income from pa-
tronage dividends. In some cases where the farmer included patronage
dividends in his income the Revenue Service advised him that he had made
a mistake and adjusted his tax downward.
14. Revenue Act of 1962, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1381-88 (Supp. 1962).
15. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1962).
16. Id. at 118.
17. See, e.g., statement of Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Fi-
nance Committee, on the floor of the Senate on May 21, 1962, reproduced
in Part 10 of the Report of Hearings of the Senate Finance Committee on
H. R. 10650, at 4400.
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mation returns by the paying corporations was substituted."1
At that time, the Committee insisted that the distributing coopera-
tive pay 20 percent or more of the distribution to the patron in
cash. 9 Presumably, this was related to the lowest personal income
tax bracket of 20 percent although everyone concerned recognized
that a given patron of the cooperative may pay no income tax or
may be in the upper income brackets.
The other principle was that there must be a voluntary consent
by the patron to include the patronage distribution in his income.
The provisions surrounding this principle became most elaborate.
If the patron agreed that the distribution was taxable income to
him, then obviously he could not complain that Congress was tax-
ing him on a mere paper distribution. Then, and only then, the
cooperative was permitted a deduction. This complication was fur-
ther elaborated by the provision for three permissible kinds of
consents: a written consent by the patron that the patronage dis-
tribution he was about to receive or had received would be taxable
income to him ;2' an appropriate endorsement of the patron's check
for the portion of the patronage refund that he received in cash;
and "by-law consent" by which the cooperative gained the consent
of the patron by a specific provision in the by-laws to that effect.
The by-law consent was carefully hedged about with provisions
aimed at protecting the patron from being taxed on income rep-
resented by distributions of patronage dividends without advance
notice. It required that the cooperative adopt a by-law consent
provision after the date of the enactment of the Revenue Act of
1962; that the patron receive a copy of such by-law and "a written
notification" explaining its significance; and that after those events
had transpired, either an existing patron must retain his member-
ship or a new patron obtain his membership. The Senate Finance
Committee obligingly included in its report language of a by-law
provision that it considered proper for a "by-law consent."'" The
18. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 120, 324 (1962).
19. Id. at 114, 317.
20. As the bill first appeared, the cooperative would have been required
to obtain a new written consent from each patron each year. See STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 87TH CONG. I ST. SESS.
COMMITTEE DISCUSSION DRAFT OF REVENUE BILL OF 1961, at 73 (Comm.
Print 1961) (for the House Committee on Ways and Means). This bill
was soon modified, however, to permit the written consent to stand until
revoked by the patron.
21.
Each person who hereafter applies for and is accepted to member-
ship in this cooperative and each member of this cooperative on the
effective date of this by-law who continues as a member after such
date shall, by such act alone, consent that the amount of any dis-
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Committee also pointed out that the purpose of notification was
not merely to quote the language of the by-law consent, but to "in-
form the patron . .. of its significance,"'  and that notification
must be given to each patron separately and not merely by pub-
lication in a newspaper or by posting at the cooperative's head-
quarters.
The provisions in the Internal Revenue Code designed to carry
out these basic principles added to the brief existing provisions
dealing with cooperatives some necessarily intricate language."m
Untangled and summarized, they are basically as follows.
Section 1381. The new provisions apply both to exempt coop-
eratives and to non-exempt cooperatives, but a separate provision
gives special consideration to the exempt cooperative. The new
provisions do not apply to mutual savings banks, insurance com-
panies, or rural electric and telephone cooperatives.
Section 1382(a)-(b). In general, taxable income of a coop-
erative shall be reduced2 by the amount of patronage distribu-
tions that are paid in cash or property or that meet the test for
qualified written allocations. In addition, taxable income shall be
reduced by the amount paid in money or property to redeem previ-
ously issued written allocations that at the time did not qualify.'m
tributions with respect to his patronage occurring after
which are made in written notices of allocation (as defined in 26
U.S.C. 1388) and which are received by him from the cooperative,
will be taken into account by him at their stated dollar amounts in
the manner provided in 26 U.S.C. 1385(a) in the taxable year in which
such written notices of allocation are received by him.
S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (1962).
22. Id. at 382.
23. Section 17 of the Revenue Act of 1962, which adds Subchapter T,
§§ 1381-88, to the Code, is approximately 3,000 words long. There are
another 3,000 words devoted to the reporting requirements and clerical
amendments, §§ 6042-44.
24. The drafters partially side-stepped the problem of whether to re-
fer to the reduction of gross income as an "exclusion" from gross income,
as has often been considered most theoretically correct, see Farmers Co-op.
v. Birmingham, 86 F. Supp. 201, 217 (N.D. Iowa 1949), or as a "deduc-
tion." Section 1382(b) says that in determining taxable income "there shall
not be taken into account" the patronage distributions. But its closing sen-
tence spoils that evasion of the issue by adding: "For purposes of this
title, any amount not taken into account under the preceding sentence shall
be treated in the same manner as an item of gross income and as a deduc-
tion therefrom." (Emphasis added.)
25. This means written distributions that at the time of issuance did not
qualify, but were issued with respect to earnings of years beginning Janu-
ary 1, 1963, or later. Treas. Reg. § 1.1382-3(d) (1963). This interpreta-
tion is based on the provision of § 17(c) of the Revenue Act of 1962,
which provides that in case of money paid after January 1, 1963, or
after the first day of a taxable year beginning in 1963, "with respect to
patronage occurring before such first day, the tax treatment . .. shall
1963] 1003
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:997
Section 1382(c). In addition to the deduction for patronage
distributions, an "exempt" cooperative shall also be entitled to de-
duct amounts paid as dividends on its stock and as patronage re-
funds on earnings resulting from other business than that done with
its regular patrons. This subsection carries forward, with improve-
ment in language, the provisions formerly contained in section 522.
Section 521, which defines "exempt" cooperatives, was left in-
tact except for clerical amendment.
Section 1383. This section sets up special rules for computing
the tax when previously issued non-qualifying allocations are re-
deemed.
Section 1385. Any patronage distribution that "qualifies"
for deduction by the cooperative is taxable income to the patron
unless it is an adjustment to basis of property (as would be the
case with capital items) or is attributable to "personal, living, or
family items." The same rule applies to cash or property received
in redemption (or on sale or other disposition) of a previously
issued non-qualified allocation.
Section 1388. This section contains definitions, including
that of "qualified" distributions and, therefore, the sticky provisions
relating to the "consent" of the patron. A "qualified" allocation
is one that is paid 20 percent or more in money26 and the bal-
ance either by a written notice that may be redeemed in cash at
its face amount within 90 days or by a written notice that the pa-
tron has consented to take into account at its face value. The patron
may consent in any one of the following ways: (1) by consenting
be made under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 without regard to Sub-
chapter T .... ." See the note following 26 U.S.C.A. § 1381 (Supp.1962). The Senate Finance Committee Report also made it clear that this
was the intended result. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1962).26. The statute actually says 20% or more must be paid in money "orby qualified check." This is an interesting quirk, implying that the qualified
check is not money. Undoubtedly it was inserted out of caution to avoid
any assertion by the Treasury that a qualified check for 20%, endorsed and
cashed, did not render the patronage distribution a "qualified" distTibution.But it has caused a question to be raised as to whether, if a patron is al-
ready bound by a by-law consent, the "qualified" check sent him is a suf-ficient payment of the 20%. Many cooperatives apparently plan to sendthe "qualified" check to all patrons in spite of some of them being boundby by-law consent since it is difficult to pick out the nonmember patrons.The check is probably no longer a "qualified" check if it is received by a
member who is covered by a by-law consent, the "statement imprinted
thereon" being disregarded; it is then "money" for the purpose of this
statute although it is true that a check does not under all circumstances
constitute "money." Updike v. People, 92 Colo. 125, 18 P.2d 472 (1933);State v. Griswold, 73 Conn. 95, 46 Atd. 829 (1900); Bates v. Farmers &Merchants Say. Bank, 219 Iowa 78, 257 N.W. 578 (1934). CompareDeones v. Zeches, 212 Minn. 260, 263, 3 N.W.2d 433 (1942).
1004
TAXATION OF COOPERATIVES
in writing; (2) by obtaining or retaining membership in the co-
operative after it has adopted a consent by-law, which must have
been adopted after the passage of the 1962 Revenue Act, and af-
ter receiving written notification and a copy of the by-law; or (3)
by endorsing and cashing a "qualified check" within a prescribed
period. The qualified check is defined as a check or other instru-
ment redeemable in money paid as part of a patronage distribution
"on which there is clearly imprinted a statement that the endorse-
ment and cashing of the check (or other instrument) constitutes
the consent of the payee to include" in his income the amount of
the entire patronage distribution of which the check is a part. The
prescribed period for cashing the check is 90 days from the close
of the "payment period" of the cooperative, and the "payment
period" is the period within which the cooperative must make
the patronage distribution.' The cooperative may, however, limit
the period within which the check will be honored to less than
90 days.2s
The preceding summary omits a number of special and detailed
provisions and outlines only the basic items of a complex new
subchapter of the Internal Revenue Code. Congress, in attempting
to tax income previously untaxed, has created a maze that requires
careful parsing of language and much cross-reference. In addi-
tion, once the provisions are understood, the individual cooperative
must step cautiously to avoid pitfalls. The regulation writers have
worked carefully, but their product is necessarily wordy and some-
times difficult to follow. Such situations have been criticized be-
fore.29 Both the congressional committees and the technicians do
seem to be creating unduly elaborate structures to please all who
have had a hand in the work. There were only two concepts to
be enunciated-that part of the patronage distribution must be in
cash, and that the patron must consent to include it in his income.
The law became tangled in trying to specify in precise terms and
with precise limitations several different ways of giving consent.
One may wonder whether complexity was avoidable and whether
the elaborate provisions will work.
27. The payment period is defined in § 1382(d) as running from the first
day of the taxable year to eight and one-half months after the close of
such year.
28. Treas. Reg. § 1-1388.1(c)(3)(iii)(a) (1963).
29. See, e.g., Robertson, Speaking Out: Change Those Unfair Tax Laws,
Saturday Evening Post, March 17, 1962, p. 10; Wormser, Is It Time To
Write a Whole New Income Tax Law?, U.S. News, March 18, 1963, p. 60.
10051963]
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III. PROBLEMS OF COMPLIANCE
Cooperatives all over the country have feverishly begun to com-
ply with the new requirements. Hardest pressed were those operat-
ing on a calendar-year basis that desired to use the "by-law
consent" method; they had to amend their by-laws and notify their
members before the end of 1962 if the consent was to be effec-
tive as to patronage for the entire year 1963.30 Regulations had
not been adopted, and in fact were not even proposed, until too
late in 1962 to be of any assistance31 since the cooperatives general-
ly had to amend their by-laws by formal action of the membership.
Some of the questions that obviously will not be settled until a
substantial period has elapsed can be anticipated now. Difficulties
can arise if members have not been notified of a consent by-law
until after the beginning of the cooperative's fiscal year. Some
cooperatives may be able to show that the period prior to the giv-
ing of notice was actually a period of loss operations. They may,
therefore, argue that since all of the amount distributed was earn-
ed after the giving of notice, it is entitled to full deduction. The
Treasury would probably point out that patronage refunds are
based upon total patronage; if a member dealt with the cooperative
only during the period before giving of notice, even if it was a
"loss" period, he would still be given a patronage refund (which
is true under most cooperatives' by-laws and practices). Therefore,
the Treasury may take the position that regardless of losses, if
notice was not given until one month of the year had gone by, one-
twelfth of the amount distributed will be treated as "non-quali-
fied" and disallowed as a deduction.
The cooperatives are unhappy about a provision of the
regulations that prohibits them from treating a reduction of the
debt of a patron to his cooperative as part of the required 20
percent cash payment.3" It is understandably galling to a coopera-
tive to have to send a check for hard cash to a patron who has been
a consistent collection problem to the cooperative and who owes
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.1388-1(c)(3)(ii) states "a consent made in the man-
ner described in this subdivision shall be effective only with respect to
patronage occurring alter the patron has received a copy of the bylaw
and the prerequisite notice and while he is a member of the organization."
(Emphasis added.) Cf. Simons v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 744 (1962)(election to be taxed as a small business corporation under Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, §§ 1371-77 filed one day late was held ineffective).
31. The regulations were proposed on December 29, 1962. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1381-1 (1963).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.1388-1(c)(1)(ii): "A 'payment in money' as that
term is used . . . does not include a credit against amounts owed by the
patron to the cooperative organization . .. .
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a sizable balance at the moment. The organization should not
have to lure every delinquent patron into its establishment for the
purpose of having him endorse back to it, as payment on his ac-
count, the "20 percent" check. The Treasury's position evidently
is that its regulation is in keeping with the statutory phrase "paid
in money" and with the expressed purpose of the 20 percent pro-
vision, which is to furnish the patron the cash with which to pay
his tax.33 Whether any cooperative will challenge the regulation in
court remains to be seen.
Another cause of uneasiness among the cooperatives is the pro-
vision binding the new member by a "consent by-law." The regu-
lation provides that "a prospective member must receive the notifi-
cation and copy of the bylaw before he becomes a member of the
organization in order to have his membership in the organiza-
tion constitute consent. '34 While the statute seems clearly to pre-
scribe this requirement, it poses a severe mechanical problem for
the cooperative. Many cooperatives have operated under a system
whereby patronage automatically created membership. Often it is
not possible to give the patron notice of the new by-law before
accepting his products or selling him supplies-as where he sends
products by an independent hauler who may not be his agent to
receive such a notice. Some cooperatives have changed their by-
laws to provide that a new patron becomes a member only after
both patronizing the organization and receiving a notice of the
consent by-law This should be effective although it conceivably
may be attacked by the Treasury if the facts indicate the patron
received the notice simultaneously with becoming a member in-
stead of before becoming a member. Some hair-splitting may
take place before acceptable procedures are determined. In any
event, the requirement of notification before membership seems
certain to trap some unwary cooperatives. If someone has already
become a new member and was not given notification before join-
ing, he cannot be bound by the consent by-law. If the cooperative
discovers the fact in time, it can try either to obtain a specific
written consent or to give qualified checks to the new member or
class of new members involved. But if it believes it has properly
complied with the new law and actually has not, it may be surpris-
ed to discover two or more years later that it has made patronage
distributions that did not qualify. The result would be a surprise
tax possibly of substantial size.
A consequence of the new legislation only partially foreseen by
33. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1962).
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.1388-1()(3)(ii) (1963).
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the Congress is its impact on the exempt cooperative. The exempt
cooperative is handicapped by the statutory requirements for ex-
emption and the regulations under them that deal with the treat-
ment of a patron who refuses to consent to take the patronage
distribution into his income.35 The non-exempt cooperative can,
if its by-laws permit, discriminate between the "consenter" and the
"non-consenter"; that is, the non-exempt cooperative can take
the position that because it must pay tax on the portion of its
net earnings that it is unable to distribute on a patronage basis in
the form of qualified allocations due to the refusal of the "non-
consenter" to give his consent, it will deduct the amount of the tax
that it must pay from the amount that it will distribute to the
"non-consenters." For example, if the total amount of net earn-
ings otherwise allocable to the "non-consenters" doing business
with a particular "non-exempt" cooperative is 10,000 dollars, the
cooperative can expect to pay approximately 3,000 dollars in fed-
eral income tax on that amount. It can subtract the amount of tax
paid and distribute only 7,000 dollars to the "non-consenters,"
and each "non-consenter" will receive a non-qualified written al-
location for only 70 percent of what he otherwise would have re-
ceived. If an exempt cooperative wishes to retain its exemption,
this treatment is not possible. It must distribute by written alloca-
tion the entire 10,000 dollars, for the principle that an exempt
cooperative must treat all patrons alike has been specifically in-
corporated in the revised regulations.36 Since the distribution
will not be a qualified distribution, the exempt cooperative is not
compelled to pay 20 percent of the amount in cash, but it is
required by the regulation to distribute by the written allocations
the full 100 percent or lose its exemptions. Thus, we have the
anomalous situation where an exempt cooperative with a total
income of 100,000 dollars, 10,000 dollars of which was attribut-
able to patronage of "non-consenters," will have to pay a tax of
3,000 dollars and still be required to distribute in qualified and
non-qualified written notices of allocation the entire 100,000 dol-
lars. The result is that it has paid in taxes and distributed in written
notices a total of 103,000 dollars although its earnings were only
100,000 dollars.37 This side-effect may result in some coopera-
35. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 521(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.1388-1
(c)(3) (1963).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.521-1(f) (1963).
37. The Treasury points out that the situation is not as bad as it seems
since the exempt cooperative will presumably receive a tax deduction later
for redeeming the $10,000 of non-qualified allocations that it issues. This,
of course, does not allow for the possible impairment of the exempt co-
operative's surplus during the interim, nor the possibility that it may never
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fives that are now exempt giving up their exempt status. Each
must weigh this disadvantage against the advantages of re-
taining an exemption.38
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW PROVISIONS
While there is no case involving an identical situation," cases
in which similar statutory provisions have been upheld indicate
that the new provisions are probably constitutional. There are
many cases where stockholders of corporations are taxed on divi-
dends or on other quasi-income items that they did not in fact re-
ceive.40
The first group of these involves personal holding company
earnings. If a personal holding company fails to distribute its in-
come to its shareholders, it is taxed by the federal government at
a punitive rate on that income.41 Some states, however, have adopt-
ed the alternative route of taxing the shareholders of the personal
holding company on that company's income as though it had
been distributed. McCreery v. McColgan ' held that the Cali-
fornia law so providing was constitutional under both state and
federal constitutions. The opinion reviewed both federal and
state cases and held that the statute was not a violation of either
be able to redeem the non-qualified notice of allocation and thereby take
advantage of the later deduction, nor the possibility that the law might be
changed before it is able to do so. The regulation does attempt to permit
the exempt cooperative to try to compensate itself for the loss of use of
the money by paying a lower rate of interest on non-qualified notices of
allocation than on qualified notices.
38. The advantages of "exempt" status are: (1) deductibility of dividends
paid, § 1382(c); (2) deductibility of patronage refunds distributed that rep-
resent earnings on business transacted with the United States or other
governmental units or from sources other than patronage (for example,
rental or interest income), § 1382(c); (3) exemption from federal docu-
mentary stamp taxes, § 4382(a)(3); (4) exemption from the registration re-
quirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 76, 15 U.S.C. § 77c
(a)(5) (1958).
39. In Long Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 726, 731 (4th
Cir. 1957), the court said in dictum that requiring the cooperative patrons
"to pay tax upon- income which they have not received, over which they
have been given no control, and which they may never receive" would
raise a question of constitutionality "which would be a serious one."
40. Cf. the numerous cases upholding the constitutionality of taxing in-
come of a trust to persons other than the person receiving the income.
E.g., Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933); Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S.
172 (1933); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930); see Heffelfinger v.
Commissioner, 87 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1937); Carlisle v. Commissioner,
165 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1948). Compare Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S.
206 (1931).
41. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 541.
42. 17 Cal. 2d 555, 110 P.2d 1051 (1941).
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the due process or the equal protection clauses. The court dis-
tinguished Eisner v. Macomber,43 which held that the taxation of
stock dividends was unconstitutional as a levy on capital without
apportionment, by pointing out that Macomber has not been fol-
lowed in cases where the stock dividend was issued in stock of a
different class than that held by the stockholders receiving the
dividend. Also, the California court felt that the tone of decisions
in the United States Supreme Court since Macomber indicates that
it would approve as constitutional a statute, such as the California
law, that taxes the income of the personal holding company to
the stockholders whether the income had been distributed to them
as dividends or not.44
Another group of cases involving the taxation of undistributed
corporate earnings to the stockholders is that involving unreason-
able accumulations. A corporation may be taxed if it is accumu-
lating earnings and profits beyond the reasonable needs of the
business. 5 Corresponding provisions in previous revenue codes
and revenue acts have been upheld. In the leading case of Hel-
vering v. National Grocery Co.,46 the Supreme Court said:
If the business had been carried on by Kohl individually all the year's
profits would have been taxable to him. If, having a partner, the busi-
ness had been carried on as a partnership, all the year's profits
would have been taxable to the partners individually, although these
had been retained by the partnership undistributed . . . . Kohl, the
sole owner of the business, could not by conducting it as a corporation,
prevent Congress, if it chose to do so, from laying on him individually
the tax on the jear's profits.
In a footnote at the end of this language, the Court implied that
it was constitutional for Congress to tax the stockholder of the
corporation as though he had received the corporation's income. It
said in part:
The first statute which provided for taxation where corporate profits
are accumulated for the purpose of preventing the imposition of sur-
taxes upon stockholders was the Tariff Act of 1913 . . . . In that
Act, in the Revenue Act of 1916 . . ., and in the Revenue Act of
1918, . . . the tax was laid upon the shareholder. In all later Revenue
Acts, the tax is laid upon the corporation . . . . The Revenue Acts
of 1918 and 1921 . . . also taxed the shareholders of "personal serv-
ice corporations" like partners. Section 112(k) of the Revenue Act
43. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
44. See Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938); Annot.,
130 A.L.R. 408 (1941); cf. Marsman v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 335(4th Cir. 1953), holding income of a foreign personal holding company
taxable to a United States resident stockholder although the income had not
been distributed to him and assuming the result was constitutional.
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 531.
46. 304 U.S. 282, 288 (1938).
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of 1932 . provide[s] for the disregard of the corporate entity
in certain cases where foreign corporations are used for the purpose
of avoiding federal taxes. ... 4
Thus, the Supreme Court clearly implied that it is permissible to
tax the shareholder in this manner rather than the corporation.s
Analogy to these cases upholding the constitutionality of similar
types of provisions suggests that the by-law consent provision re-
lating to cooperatives is constitutional.
CONCLUSION
Cooperatives cannot complain about the basic principles estab-
lished in the new Subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code.
Their problems come from the complexity of the details set out in
the law, some of which would have been better left out. There
will be a substantial amount of bickering and confusion over the
administration of the law, followed by only a modest amount of
litigation. There seems to be no present disposition on the part
of the cooperatives to ask for corrective or modifying legislation,
nor should there be.
47. Id. at 288 n.4.
48. See also Collector v. Hubbard, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1 (1871), ex-
pressly so holding.
Although it has not yet been constitutionally tested the consent provisions
of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are probably valid.
In general, § 1371 provides that a corporation having ten or fewer indi-
vidual stockholders may elect to be taxed as a partnership. If the election
is made, all stockholders are taxed individually on the corporate income
as though they were partners according to the interests that they hold.
Although all stockholders must initially assent to the election, the election
when once made can be revoked only if all persons who are shareholders
in the corporation on the day on which the revocation is made consent.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e)(2). Thus, a shareholder refusing to con-
sent to the revocation can impose his will upon other shareholders who wish
to revoke the election, thereby keeping them obligated to include their
share of the corporation's income as personal income. This is more onerous
than the consent provision relating to cooperatives whereby a majority vote
of shareholders adopting a consent by-lav for the cooperative would be
binding upon the minority. A patron or minority member of the coopera-
tive can avoid the tax result by ceasing to do business with the cooperative.
The minority shareholder of the small corporation, on the other hand, can
avoid the tax result only by selling his stock. Because his corporation is,
by definition, a closely-held one, the sale may have to be at a substantial
loss. The committee reports on this provision indicate that at the time it
was adopted, no questions of constitutionality were raised or discussed.
1958-3 CuM. BULL. 1008-10; 1137-47; 1223-24.
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